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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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Moscow's Diplomatic Presence:
The Record Under Gorbachev [REDACTED]

Summary

Soviet efforts to expand their foreign diplomatic presence as a means of promoting influence have increased substantially under General Secretary Gorbachev. Since 1986, Moscow has scored some minor victories by negotiating increases in its diplomatic presence in two countries and establishing new relations with five others. Under Gorbachev, the Soviet diplomatic service also has set higher standards for its foreign service officers and extended the "openness" campaign to the operations of Soviet embassies and consulates. Soviet efforts to increase their diplomatic presence probably will remain frustrated by Moscow's continued use of its foreign embassies and consulates for intelligence activities. [REDACTED]

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Moscow's Diplomatic Presence : The Record Under Gorbachev

General Secretary Gorbachev has taken a number of initiatives designed to increase the Soviet diplomatic presence worldwide as a means of promoting influence and Soviet programs.

at a mid-1986 meeting in Moscow, Gorbachev made it clear that he intended to energize the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to prod Soviet diplomats into being more aggressive in broadening their contacts overseas and in spreading a positive, professional image of the Soviet Union. At the same time, he continued efforts to negotiate an increased presence in several countries and establish relations with several others.


Little Increase in Presence

Under Gorbachev, the USSR has substantially increased its efforts to add diplomats to existing foreign embassies and consulates, expand existing facilities, and open diplomatic relations with new countries. These efforts appear to have scored some minor victories and include:

- o The establishment or reestablishment of relations with Chad, Qatar, Nauru, Vanuatu, and Oman--which brings the number of nations in which the Soviets have embassies and consulates to 133, five more than when Gorbachev assumed power in 1986 (see figure one).
- o An increase in Soviet diplomatic presence in Colombia. In Colombia the Soviets added three diplomats to their embassy, and
- o Growing informal contacts with a number of states as a prelude to more formal ties in the future. Moscow is making overtures to Bahrain, Israel, Saudi Arabia and South Korea, among others.

Figure One

SOVIET DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE



Nations Moscow had relations with before 1985

Some contacts — Moscow is developing relations.
Bahrain, Israel, Saudi Arabia, South Korea

Nations which established or resumed diplomatic relations with
Moscow since 1985.

Chad, Nauru, Oman, Qatar, Vanuatu


- o Growing efforts to increase their diplomatic presence in at least 12 other countries--Australia, Finland, Jordan, Kuwait, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tunisia and Zambia. (see figure two) [REDACTED]

Several factors continue to limit Soviet efforts to increase its total foreign diplomatic presence. Because embassies are established on the basis of bilateral treaties, any increase in the number of Soviet diplomats in an existing embassy must be negotiated. Negotiations are usually time consuming and increases have been granted infrequently as many nations harbor suspicions of Soviet diplomats. For example, [REDACTED] Kuwaiti officials turned down a September 1987 Soviet request to increase its diplomatic presence because the Kuwaitis believed that more Soviet officials "increase the prospects for mischief and subversion." Moscow's efforts are further hindered by a large number of diplomatic expulsions; between 1970 and 1987 a total of 366 Soviet diplomats were expelled with 26 percent of the expulsions occurring since 1984. As a result, [REDACTED] the Soviets will continue to encounter reluctance on the part of most countries to allow an increased Soviet presence [REDACTED]

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Figure Two

SUVIET TARGETS FOR EXPANDING PRESENCE



■ Nations with standing Soviet requests to increase diplomatic presence

Australia, Finland, Jordan, Kuwait, Mexico, Netherlands,
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tunisia, Zambia

■ Nations with increases in Soviet diplomatic presence

1985-1988

Saudi Arabia, Syria

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Focus on Quality and Image

Although the total number of Soviet diplomats stationed abroad appears to be only slightly higher than when Gorbachev took office, we believe Gorbachev is hopeful that quality improvements in his foreign diplomatic corps will improve its reputation and assist Soviet efforts to increase its foreign presence. One of the most significant changes in the Soviet diplomatic service under Gorbachev has been the higher standards set for its foreign service officers. Changes seem aimed at both increasing the efficiency of the foreign service, as well as extending Gorbachev's "openness" campaign to the operations of Soviet embassies and consulates. Gorbachev has tried to improve the operations of Soviet embassies by recalling some ambassadors, and having others retrained in place, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Under Gorbachev, the rules for all Soviet ambassadors abroad include:

- o A requirement that they adopt a more engaging and outgoing style. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] a directive was issued to all Soviet diplomats in [REDACTED] 1986 condemning past isolationist policies whereby Soviet diplomats considered themselves in "enemy" territory while overseas. The directive required Soviet diplomats to actively pursue personal contacts in order to foster friendship and confidence with host country officials.

- o A requirement that they submit balanced, objective, and critical reporting of affairs within their countries. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Gorbachev was angry that Soviet diplomats rarely forward negative reports to Moscow, especially concerning public and private reactions to significant Soviet proposals and initiatives. Gorbachev claimed that Soviet diplomatic reporting had crippled his ability to carry out foreign policy effectively.

- o A refusal to tolerate corruption or illegal activities abroad by Soviet diplomats. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] a Soviet diplomat stated that disciplinary measures were taken in mid-July 1986 against several Soviet ambassadors following criticism by Gorbachev that Soviet officials were using overseas assignments to amass personal wealth. [REDACTED]

These measures were supplemented by changes in the diplomatic career service and in the training of new diplomats. Moscow recently took steps to eliminate nepotism and create a new, more competitive

system for careers in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[REDACTED] Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze implemented a policy in [REDACTED] 1988 that prohibits hiring children of Soviet diplomatic personnel on active service as new diplomats, or assigning those already in the diplomatic service overseas. [REDACTED] Shevardnadze also set up a training program for new Soviet diplomats which resembles the US foreign service system. [REDACTED]

Moscow's attempts to improve the quality of its diplomatic corps have been coupled with attempts to improve the corps image. [REDACTED] the new Soviet image has been particularly noticeable in Europe, where Soviet diplomats actively court high-level European officials, travel frequently around their assigned countries, and show up at more diplomatic functions than in the past. In the Third World, Soviet diplomats stress issues such as the right of the Third World to participate fully in international arms control and protection of the environment. [REDACTED] the Soviets launched an unusually aggressive diplomatic campaign on the issue of dumping hazardous waste in Africa during the summer of 1988 in an effort to score points with African countries and drive a wedge between them and the West. [REDACTED]

The USSR also has used its diplomatic corps more aggressively to turn international issues and negotiations to its advantage. It has consistently pushed such objectives as:

- o Moving bilateral issues to the multilateral arena. [REDACTED] the Soviets hope that the involvement of many nations in issues currently under bilateral discussion will bring pressure on the United States to show more flexibility in its negotiations. Moscow's use of its diplomats in this effort has primarily targeted the Third World. [REDACTED] many Third World nations, including India, Indonesia and Zaire have reported aggressive approaches by Soviet ambassadors attempting to increase Third World participation in the negotiation of sensitive arms control issues.
- o Weakening Western support for deterrence. [REDACTED] a major goal of Gorbachev is to undermine Western support for nuclear deterrence. This effort has been assisted by the extremely active and outgoing diplomacy of Soviet ambassadors assigned to Western Europe, who are attempting to create a less threatening view of the USSR throughout Europe, [REDACTED]

- o Setting the international agenda. Under Gorbachev, Moscow's diplomatic corps has attempted to discourage international consideration of issues which cast the Soviets in a bad light. Conversely, they promote issues which reflect poorly on the United States. For example, Moscow has attempted to deflect criticism of its human rights record by promoting the right of all people "not to live under a chandelier of exotic weapons," i.e., the Strategic Defense Initiative. [REDACTED]

Espionage: Same Old Story

Despite numerous Soviet pronouncements stating that the USSR is engaged in a new approach to international relations, the record shows that Moscow has not slowed the use of its foreign embassies and consulates for intelligence purposes which probably will continue to be the single most important limiting factor in expanding Soviet diplomatic presence abroad. [REDACTED] host governments in eight countries publicly expelled 19 Soviet diplomats in 1987. Of these nations, seven had expelled Soviet diplomats in previous years, and at least five of these diplomats were believed to be affiliated with the KGB. Moreover, [REDACTED] despite "the new political mentality" which Gorbachev wants to inject into his relations with the West, they saw a clear resurgence of operational activities by the Soviet GRU and KGB residencies in France. French expulsion in 1987 of six Soviet diplomats accused of recruiting agents, illegally gathering economic and national defense data, and gathering information on the Ariane IV rocket reflected this belief. [REDACTED]

Other evidence of Soviet foreign diplomats engaged in intelligence activities since 1985 include:



- o The acquisition of sensitive Zairian documents. [REDACTED], the Zairian counterespionage service apprehended a member of a Soviet spy network, who confessed that he had passed several sensitive documents to the KGB.

Three Soviet diplomats were sent home over this incident in August 1987.

- o Political and economic espionage by a first secretary at the Soviet embassy in Switzerland in May 1987. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] this Soviet diplomat paid a computer expert "considerable sums" to gain access to the secret bank accounts of both Swiss and foreign businessmen who could then presumably be blackmailed.

Moscow has also continued its efforts to acquire additional diplomatic facilities in sensitive areas to assist in intelligence gathering activities.

[REDACTED]